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Abstract: This paper follows the new economic geography approach to model the relationships between 
trade policy and spatial agglomeration of production in the context of a small open developing economy. We 
construct a general equilibrium model with interactions between centripetal forces and centrifugal forces that 
determine linkages between urban and rural regions.  Centripetal forces such as labor migration, increasing 
returns, and transport costs tend to concentrate economic activities and population in the urban region.  This 
causes the inequality between urban and rural areas to increase.  On the other hand, centrifugal forces such as 
congestion and urban land rents favor dispersion of firms and workers.  This favors a balanced urban system 
that is conducive for rural development.  We concentrate on explaining how trade policy affects the 
interactions between these forces by implementing the theoretical model through numerical simulations.  The 
results suggest that trade liberalization can improve urban-rural inequalities as long as the country that 
implements trade policy reform does not face any trade restrictions in the external market.  
Keywords: agglomeration; urban-rural inequalities; trade policy; trade costs  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Less developed countries have experienced a 
rapid urbanization process during the last few 
decades.  Half a century ago just 41 of the world's 
100 largest cities were in less developing 
countries (LDCs). This number had increased to 
64 by 1995.  This proportion is predicted to rise 
with more people moving from rural to urban 
areas and nearly 90 percent of the worlds future 
urban population living LDCs (World Bank, 
1999).  Moreover, there is a growing body of 
empirical literature indicating the structures of 
cities in LDCs are much more dominated by 
metropolitan regions compared to the experiences 
of developed countries (DCs) at similar stage of 
economic development (Puga, 1996).   
The motivation for this paper comes from 
Krugman and Livas (1996) that developed a 
formal model and demonstrated the effect of trade 
policy on the third world metropolis. The 
Krugman and Livas model (henceforth the KL 
model) was inspired by the experience of Mexico 
City, the worlds largest city.  Prior to the late 
1980s, Mexico followed a classic strategy of 
industrial development through import-
substitution industrialization; the result was the 
emergence of an inward-looking economic base; 
much of it concentrated in the immediate vicinity 
of Mexico City. (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 
(1999, p. 329).  According to Krugman and Livas, 
the concentration of industries in Mexico City 
was the result of an inward-looking 
industrialization strategy.  The advantages from 
backward and forward linkages in Mexico City 
have outweighed the disadvantages of high land 
rents, wages, congestion and pollution.  Thus, the 
KL model was developed to formalize the 
observation of Mexico Citys experience.   
This paper examines the applicability of the KL 
model to other LDCs.  While retaining the 
structure of the KL model intact, we relax one 
critical assumption of the KL model regarding 
export trade costs. Given the circumstance of 
Mexico whose trade liberalization culminated 
with the establishment of North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the zero-export trade 
cost assumption in the KL model could be 
realistic in the context it is set-up.  However, 
these conditions may not apply to other LDCs.     
2. THE MODEL 
A fuller version of the model with detailed 
derivations of utility function and production 
function is available in the original paper by 
Krugman and Livas (1996) as well as further 
extensions by Gelan (2002) and Paluzie (2001).  
Here it proves useful concentrate on a salient 
view of the issues involved and few equations that 
incorporate key relationships. We represent 
regions generically by r (the reference region) and 
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s (the other regions) or we denote the designation 
of a region signing subscripts as 1, 2, 0 to mean 
the centre, the periphery or the rest of the world 
respectively. 
2.1. Overview 
We imagine a small open economy with two 
domestic regions, urban and rural, and an external 
region. Each region has a single monopolistically 
competitive industry producing a composite good 
using one factor of production, labor.  The labor 
force is fixed, fully employed and mobile between 
domestic regions but not internationally.  All 
regions interact in the product market with 
shipments of goods from one region involving 
costs that are broadly understood as trade costs.  
The latter includes transport costs as well as any 
other barrier to trade that businesses face to 
access the external market.   As in most new 
economic geography (NEG) models, the 
dynamics of this model depends on tensions 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces.   
Centrifugal forces could be pure external 
diseconomies such as congestion, pollution, urban 
land rents, the attraction of moving away from 
highly competitive urban locations to less 
competitive rural ones (Krugman and Livas, 
1996, p. 141).  In this model, we allow only one 
centrifugal force, commuting cost or land rent.  
The notion of a mono-centric city structure is 
employed to show the relationships between 
wages, commuting cost and labor time (Krugman 
and Livas 1996; Fujita and Krugman, 1995).  
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Figure 1  Monocentric city strucutre 
This relies on a simplified spatial model that 
assumes a long and narrow economy, one 
dimensional, with a central business district 
(CBD) with workers residential places spreading 
on both sides of the CBD and a unit of land per 
worker (see Figure 1).  On the one hand, the 
highest land rent is paid at the centre where 
commuting cost is negligible.  The level of land 
rent declines with distance from the CBD with the 
commuting distance of the last workers living at 
the outskirts of the city being given as 0.5d, 
where d is the total distance between O and O′.  
This means that the last worker who lives at the 
outskirts of the city pays the lowest land rent but 
the highest commuting cost.  In this model, 
commuting cost is incurred in terms of potential 
labor earnings.  Note that it takes time to travel 
the distance to work from residence.  If a worker 
has a unit of labor available for work and if she 
commutes between a place of residence and a 
place of work in the CBD, then she arrives with a 
net amount of labor to sell of only 1 2 dγ− , where 
γ is the ratio of labor time spent per unit distance. 
With a given regional wage rate (Wr), a worker 
commuting to a CBD receives a net wage of only 
(1-γLr)Wr.  A worker who lives closer to the CBD, 
however, receives almost the full amount of the 
regional wage rate, Wr, but she pays a land rent 
that exactly offsets the amount she has saved by 
avoiding commuting.  Thus, the wage net of 
commuting and land rents is (1-γLr)Wr for all 
workers.  The total labor input (net of commuting 
time) in each region, Zr , is given as  
(1 0.5 )r rL Lγ− , where Lr is the labor force in 
region r. 
Centripetal forces include both pure external 
economies and market size effects (forward and 
backward linkages).  Shipments of goods between 
locations involve costs through which centripetal 
forces operate. Transport costs are the most 
commonly cited costs of moving goods between 
locations.  In order to avoid modeling a separate 
transport industry, the iceberg formulation is 
most commonly used in NEG literature. This 
formulation expresses transport cost in terms of 
the fraction of goods melting away with distance.  
For instance, if a unit of a variety of good is 
shipped from region r to region s, then only 1/ rsT  
of the original unit actually arrives at the 
destination. A broader view of shipment cost 
includes all of the costs of doing business at a 
distance (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999, p. 
98). We adopt this broader definition of trade 
costs incurred in moving goods between different 
locations.  Accordingly, we use the term trade 
cost rather than transport cost.    
2.2. Determination of instantaneous 
equilibrium for the model 
The instantaneous equilibrium of the model can 
be determined by simultaneously solving for four 
sets of equations for each region: the income 
equations, the price index equations, the nominal 
wage equations, and the real wage equations 
(Krugman and Venables 1999, pp. 331-332).  We 
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distinguish between trade barriers that the rest of 
the world faces in accessing the domestic market, 
Tm, and those that the domestic economy faces in 
the external market, Te.  We assume that foreign 
firms face the same trade cost in both domestic 
regions.  Similarly, we assume equal export trade 
cost for both internal locations implying that we 
do not allow one domestic region to have the 
advantage of proximity to the rest of the world.   
The income equations are straightforward.  Since 
labor is mobile only between the domestic 
regions, we take the labor force in the external 
region as given, 0Z .  We choose units in such a 
way that the domestic labor force is given as 1; 
hence 1λ  and 2λ  are labor force shares of the 
central and peripheral regions.  Thus, regional 
income, Yr, is given as a function of labor force 
and nominal wage rate (eqs. 1-3).   
Table 1  Equations of the system 
0 0 0Y Z W=          (1) 
1 1 1Y Wλ=                                                  (2) 
2 2 2Y Wλ=         (3) 
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 2 2e eG Z W W T W T
σ σ σλ λ− − − = + +        (4) 
( ) ( )
1
1 11 1
1 0 0 1 1 2 2m dG Z W T W W T
σ σσ σλ λ− −− − = + +   (5) 
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 2 2m dG Z W T W T W
σ σ σ σλ λ− − − − = + +   (6) 
1
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 2 2m mW Y G Y G T Y G T
σ σ σ σ σ σ− − − − − = + +      (7) 
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 2 2e dW Y G T Y G Y G T
σ σ σ σ σ σ− − − − − = + +        (8) 
1
1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 2 2e dW Y G T Y G T Y G
σ σ σ σ σ σ− − − − − = + +        (9) 
( )0 0 0 01W Gω γλ= −        (10) 
( )1 1 1 11W Gω γλ= −       (11) 
( )2 2 2 21W Gω γλ= −       (12) 
Eqs 4-6 display the determination of regional 
price index, Gr.  The parameter σ represents the 
degree of substitutability between 
monopolistically competitive manufacturing 
varieties (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).  If we assume 
that wage rates are equal in both domestic 
regions, then the price index of a particular region 
would be lower the higher the share of economic 
activity in that region.  The reason is that a larger 
proportion of locally consumed goods does not 
bear trade costs.  If the local price index is 
relatively low, then the region becomes an 
attractive place for workers.  Thus, business and 
household location decisions tend to re-enforce 
each other. 
The nominal wage equations (eqs.7-9) exhibit an 
important property of the model.  Other things 
being equal, the higher nominal wage rate in a 
region the higher level of income in the region.  
This means that a location with larger home 
market has a more than proportionate share in the 
number of businesses and hence it is in a position 
to export goods and services to other regions.   
In eqs. (10-12), the determination of real wage, 
ωr, take into account the price index, the nominal 
wage rate, and the commuting cost (land rent).  
The changes in relative real wages cause labor 
mobility across regions.  This leads to variations 
in the distribution of economic activity across 
locations over time, then   1 1 2( / )dλ θ ω ω= , 
where d denote time derivative and θ  represents 
speed of labor mobility that depend on such 
conditions as movement costs and forward-
looking behavior of migrants.   
Although the logic of this model is intuitive, the 
relationships between the variables are 
complicated enough to make it impossible to 
solve for it analytically.  At this point we resort to 
numerical simulations. 
3. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
We use graphical methods to display numerical 
solutions.  The real wage differential between the 
two domestic regions, given as 1 2/ω ω , is plotted 
against the labor force share of region 1, 1λ .  Any 
point where 1 2/ 1ω ω =  and 1 0.5λ =  represents 
an equilibrium condition because it satisfies the 
condition for an even distribution of the labor 
force between the two domestic regions.  This 
equilibrium is stable if the curve is downward 
sloping because it represents an inverse 
relationship between the real wage differentials 
and the labor force shares.  Whenever a region 
takes a lead in terms of its share of the labor 
force, the real wage there falls below that of the 
other region and hence workers would migrate 
from the former to the latter region thereby 
removing the wage differential.  
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In contrast, if the curve slopes upwards, when 
1 2/ω ω  is positively related to 1λ , then the 
equilibrium is unstable because workers would 
migrate to the region that has already more 
workers.  This may lead to a corner solution, 
where workers fully concentrate in one region and 
stay there as long as the real wage there remains 
higher than that of the other region.  The 
exogenous variables take the following values: 
σ=7, 0.2γ = , 1.5dT = , 0 10Z = , and θ = 1.  The 
wage rate of the external sector is used as a 
numeraire, i.e., 0 1W = .  We vary the trade cost 
parameters that stand for barriers between the 
domestic economy and the external region.  We 
proceed to presenting simulation results initially 
focussing on the effect of changes in Tm on the 
labor force distribution.  Here we effectively 
mimic results from the KL model. This 
illuminates the arguments involved and explains 
the properties of the model.  We then relax the 
KL model assumption of Te = 1 and repeat the 
simulation runs. We begin concentrating on 
Figure 2, which has three panels.   
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Figure 2a. Closed economy: Tm=2.25, Te = 1.0 
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Figure 2b.  Slightly open econ.:Tm=2.0, Te = 1.0 
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Figure 2c. Open economy: Tm = 1.75, , Te = 1.0 
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Figure 3a. Open economy with small export 
trade cost:  Tm = 1.75,  Te = 1.05 
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Figure 3b. Open economy with moderately 
high export trade cost:  Tm = 1.75 Te = 1.20 
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Figure 3c. Open economy with relatively high 
export trade cost:  Tm = 1.75, Te = 1.30 
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In Figure 2a, we assume a relatively high import 
tariff of 2.25mT = .  Such a high trade cost 
represents a closed economy, reminiscent of the 
import substitution industrialization strategy in 
LDCs. The equilibrium condition that allows even 
distribution of population between the two 
locations is unstable because the curve slopes 
strictly upwards indicating a strong 
agglomeration.  The only stable equilibria are the 
corner solutions, i.e., full concentration in one 
region or the other. 
Panel 2b represents the intermediate case with 
2.0mT = . This amounts to slightly opening the 
economy.  It shows a rather complicated picture.  
As in panel 2a, the symmetric equilibrium (even 
population allocation) is stable but this is 
surrounded by two unstable equilibria.  If the 
share of the labour force in one region starts from 
a sufficiently high or a sufficiently low initial 
value, then the economy converges not to the 
symmetric equilibrium but to a core-periphery 
pattern with all production in only one region. 
There are five equilibria that characterise this 
intermediate case: three stable (one at the point of 
symmetry and two corner solutions) and two 
unstable.  The key point here is that the 
agglomeration force (denoted by the intermediate 
size of Tm) is still too weak to destabilize the 
symmetric equilibrium.  However, it is strong 
enough to ensure that if all firms were 
concentrated in one region this would be a locally 
stable equilibrium as well (Puga, 1999, p. 334).  
Panel 1c is plotted for a relatively low trade cost 
parameter, 1.75mT = . This gives a unique and 
stable equilibrium with even distribution of 
population between the two locations.  This 
implies trade liberalization leads to even 
distribution of population between domestic 
regions and hence reduces regional inequalities.   
These results explain the line of argument 
developed and the simulation results obtained 
using the KL model, whose overall conclusion 
was that the forward and backward linkages are 
strong enough to create and support a single 
metropolis in a relatively closed economy.  As the 
economy is opened, these forces are weakened 
and the offsetting centrifugal forces make the less 
concentrated urban systems first possible and 
them necessary.   
Note that, following the KL model, we have 
assumed that 1eT =  in Figures 2a-2c.  Now we 
turn our attention to the alternative simulation 
results whereby domestic firms encounter trade 
barriers in the external region ( 1eT > ).  We keep 
the import trade cost parameter at the sufficiently 
low level of 1.75mT = , as in figure 2c, suggesting 
that the economy is assumed to remain open in 
this simulation run.  We then examine the effect 
of changes in Te on the distribution of economic 
activity between the two domestic regions. 
In Figure 3a, we have plotted results of two 
simulation runs.  The solid line is the same as the 
result displayed in Figure 2c, where 1.75mT =  
and 1eT = .  For the broken line, however, 
1.05eT = . Both curves represent a stable 
equilibrium with even distribution of population 
between the two domestic locations.  However, 
the broken line is flatter than the solid line, 
tending to be less stable than the solid line.  In 
Figure 3b, we slightly raise the value of  Te to 1.2.  
The result here is similar to that displayed in 
Figure 2b but for entirely different reasons. Here 
although the domestic market is sufficiently 
liberalized to guarantee even distribution of 
population between the two locations, the 
existence of trade barriers in the external market  
inhibits balanced development the domestic 
economy.  In Figure 3c, we assume a relatively 
high external trade cost of 1.3. This shows a 
complete unraveling of the results from the KL 
model. As long as there are some trade 
restrictions that hinder access of domestic firms to 
the external market, trade liberalization is not 
likely to affect the current spatial pattern in 
LDCs. A comparison of Figures 3c with 2a brings 
an interesting point to light.  Both figures 
represent a core-periphery relationship. However, 
Figure 2a suggests that a closed economy with a 
protectionist trade policy experiences uneven 
spatial development or a polarized pattern of 
relationship between rural and urban areas.  On 
the other hand, Figure 3c implies that a small 
open economy with a relatively low tariff rate 
may have a polarized regional development if it 
encounters a market access problem for its output 
in the rest of the world.      
4. CONCLUSIONS 
There has been a growing interest in trade policy 
reforms in LDCs.  The KL model is an influential 
piece of work that has illuminated the relationship 
between spatial agglomeration and trade policy in 
this context.  It was inspired by the impact of 
Mexicos trade liberalization on the countys 
regional inequalities.  This study is set out with a 
modest objective of examining the relevance of 
the KL model to the conditions of other LDCs.    
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The numerical simulations suggest that trade 
liberalization can contribute to the objective of 
reducing regional inequalities in a LDC.  
However, we have shown that the KL models 
conclusion critically depends on the assumption 
of zero-export trade costs.  Given that Mexicos 
trade liberalization was accompanied by the 
establishment of NAFTA, the KL model could be 
suitable to explain similar situations where a LDC 
may enjoy free access to a large external market.   
In order to capture the conditions of trade 
reforms, we began with a relatively high external 
trade barrier in a hypothetical LDC and reduced 
tariffs unilaterally and gradually in two scenarios.  
In the first scenario, as in the KL model, we have 
assumed that there were no restrictions for 
domestic firms to access the external market.  The 
results from our numerical simulations are similar 
to those from the KL model in that trade 
liberalization reduces inequalities between the 
domestic regions.  In the second scenario, we 
have assumed the existence of trade barriers in the 
external region.  In this case, our numerical 
simulations have shown an outcome diametrically 
opposite to that of the KL model. Although the 
size of the export trade cost parameter imposed is 
relatively low, this was strong enough to upset 
and reverse the KL model results with trade 
liberalization not being able to improve regional 
inequalities.  
This study draws attention to the potential of 
reciprocal policy reforms in trading arrangements, 
particularly between LDCs and advanced 
economies, to ameliorate core-periphery 
relationships between urban and rural areas in 
LDCs.  We have argued that market access 
problems faced by LDCs is an issue that cannot 
be ignored in evaluating the success of economic 
reforms.  Hoekman (2001, p.3) observes that 
despite the low average manufacturing tariff rates 
that apply in LDCs, tariffs for some commodities 
are over 100 percent, with most tariff peaks often 
concentrating in products that are of exporting 
interest to LDCs, (e.g. textiles and clothing).  
Hoekman cites a specific case of the US trade 
during 1999, when imports originating from 
LDCs generated tariff revenue amounting to 11.6 
percent of the value of their exports to the US and 
15.7 percent of dutiable imports.  Eliminating 
such market access barriers can help boost 
investment incentives, expand trade related 
employment opportunities, reduce urban-rural 
imbalances and contribute to poverty alleviation 
programmers.   
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